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I. INTRODUCTION
To what extent does “the right of the people to . . . bear
Arms, shall not be infringed” as guaranteed by the Second
Amendment protect the liberty to carry firearms outside the
home for self-defense or other lawful purposes?1 While most
states recognize a right to do so, either with or without a
license and subject to place restrictions, some states grant
discretion to a law enforcement agency to decide whether a
specific person “needs” or has “good cause” to carry a firearm
and restricts licenses to such persons. These discretionary
licensing schemes have become a major issue in Second
Amendment litigation, with some circuits upholding such
laws2 and others invalidating them.3
The Supreme Court has not decided the specific issue,
but essential to its interpretation of the Amendment in District
of Columbia v. Heller is the following: “At the time of the

“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II.
2 Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659 (1st Cir. 2018); Woollard v.
Sheridan, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 952 (2013);
Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2nd Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3rd Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014).
3 Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Moore
v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012); Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d
1044 (9th Cir. 2018), reh. en banc granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019).
1
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founding, as now, to ‘bear’ meant to ‘carry.’”4 More
specifically, to bear arms means to “‘wear, bear, or carry . . .
upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the
purpose . . . of being armed and ready for offensive or
defensive action in a case of conflict with another person.’”5
Preservation of the militia was the Amendment’s stated
purpose, but most Americans valued the ancient right more
for self-defense and hunting.6
While the Amendment guarantees “the individual
right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation,”7
history and tradition do not support “a right to keep and carry
any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever,” and
longstanding prohibitions such as carrying firearms in
sensitive places like schools are not in question.8 Nor may the
right be exercised in a manner as to terrify others.9
Heller declared the District of Columbia’s ban on the
possession of handguns violative of the Second Amendment.
Recalling nineteenth century state court decisions that
declared bans on the open carrying of handguns
unconstitutional, the Court noted: “Few laws in the history of
our Nation have come close to the severe restriction of the
District’s handgun ban.”10
Heller was followed by McDonald v. City of Chicago,
which reiterated that “individual self-defense is ‘the central

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008). While “bear
arms” may be used in a military context, there was no “right to be a
soldier or to wage war,” which would be an absurdity. Id. at 586. In
historical usage, “bearing arms” meant “simply the carrying of
arms,” such as “for the purpose of self-defense” or “to make war
against the King.” But limiting “bear arms” to an exclusive military
usage was inconsistent with other purposes, such as for hunting. As
the Court humorously wrote: “The right ‘to carry arms in the militia
for the purpose of killing game’ is worthy of the mad hatter.” Id. at
589.
5 Id. (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
6 Id. at 598-99.
7 Id. at 592.
8 Id. at 625-26.
9 Id. at 588 n.10.
10 Id. at 629 (citing Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846); Andrews v.
State, 50 Tenn. 165, 187 (1871); State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616-17
(1840)).
4
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component’ of the Second Amendment right.”11 McDonald
held that the Second Amendment applies to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment and invalidated Chicago’s
handgun ban.12 In Caetano v. Massachusetts, the Supreme
Court reversed a Massachusetts decision upholding that
state’s stun gun ban.13 Since the defendant had been caught
with the stun gun in a parking lot,14 the Court assumed that
the Second Amendment protects the right to bear arms in nonsensitive, public places.
The Court has granted a petition for a writ of certiorari
in a Second Amendment challenge to a New York City rule
providing that a person with a license to keep a handgun at
one’s dwelling may not take it out of the premises other than
to a licensed shooting range within the City.15 The plaintiffs
wish to transport their handguns outside the City to second
homes or to shooting ranges and competitions.16 In upholding
the rule, the lower court relied on a declaration by a police
official that allowing licensees to transport handguns to
second homes or to competitions was “a potential threat to
public safety.”17
However, to date the Court has not granted certiorari
in any of the circuit decisions upholding discretionary carry
license laws. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch,
dissented from the denial of certiorari in a Ninth Circuit
decision that the Second Amendment fails to protect the right
of a member of the general public to carry a concealed weapon
in public, but declining to decide whether open carry is
protected.18 Justice Thomas wrote that the Court “has already
suggested that the Second Amendment protects the right to
carry firearms in public in some fashion,” and that the denial

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010).
Id. at 791.
13 Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016) (per curiam).
14 Id. at 1029 (Alito, J., concurring).
15 New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of New
York, 883 F.3d 45 (2nd Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 939 (2019).
16 Id. at 52.
17 Id. at 63.
18 Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 924, 927 (9th Cir.
2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1995 (2017).
11
12
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of certiorari “reflects a distressing trend: the treatment of the
Second Amendment as a disfavored right.”19
While the lower court cases involve various issues
about the text of the Amendment, judicial precedents,
standards of review, and criminal statistics, a major bone of
contention has involved the legacy of the common law at the
American Founding and the early Republic. A virtual cottage
industry has arisen in which certain historians argue that
current restrictions are consistent with the common law
history, attorneys supporting the restrictions on behalf of
defendants and their amici rely on such historical writings in
their briefs, and courts sift through and use or reject the
arguments in either upholding or invalidating the
restrictions.20
Opponents of recognizing that the Second Amendment
protects the right of “the people” to “bear arms” seem
obsessed with Edward III’s Statute of Northampton of 1328,
which provided that no person shall “come before the King’s
Justices . . . with force and arms, nor bring no force in affray of
the peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night nor by day, in
Fairs, Markets, nor in the presence of the Justices or other
Ministers, nor in no part elsewhere . . . .”21
From some of the current literature, one would think
that this monarchal decree, written three-quarters of a century
before Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales, supersedes the explicit
language of the Second Amendment recognizing “the right to
bear arms.”22 Moreover, as William Hawkins clarified, “no

Peruta, 137 S. Ct. at 1198-99 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of
cert.).
20 See, e.g., Peruta, 824 F.3d at 939 (citing Patrick J. Charles, The Faces
of the Second Amendment Outside the Home: History Versus Ahistorical
Standards of Review, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 7-36 (2012)); Young, 896
F.3d at 1077 (Clifton, J., dissenting) (citing Eric M. Ruben & Saul
Cornell, Firearm Regionalism and Public Carry, 125 YALE L.J. F. 121, 125
(2015)). But see Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 660-61
(D.C. Cir. 2017) (“we can sidestep the historical debate on how the
first Northampton law might have hindered Londoners in the
Middle Ages. Common-law rights developed over time . . . .”).
21 2 Edw. III, c. 3 (1328).
22 “What does the Statute of Northampton provide us in terms of
evaluating the protective scope of the Second Amendment outside
the home? The answer is armed individual self-defense outside the
19
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wearing of arms is within the meaning of the statute unless it
be accompanied with such circumstances as are apt to terrify
the people . . . .”23 Yet the beating of the dead horse continues
unabated.
Litigation-driven interpretations of history to disfavor
a meaningful Second Amendment pervade this enterprise. It
involves what might be called “history office law” to describe
historians who ignore basic elements of criminal offenses in
order to show a long-standing tradition of criminalizing the
keeping and bearing of arms. It also involves what might be
called “law office history” conducted by attorneys who cite
these historians and who cherry pick and delete passages from
historical documents.
The following seeks to conduct a reality check
regarding this history and how it is being read and used. The
American experience combines bills of rights declaring the
right to bear arms together with common law restrictions
against being armed to terrorize others, requirements to find
sureties to keep the peace if armed and threatening to others,
prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons, and—as applied
only to slaves and persons of color—bans on keeping or
bearing firearms at all, or in some cases the discretionary
issuance of limited licenses. Other than that, the peaceable
bearing of arms was not a crime at the Founding or in the
early Republic.

A. THE COLONIAL PERIOD
Most of the American colonies required able-bodied
males to provide their own arms and participate in the militia,
and at times required persons to carry arms to church.
Carrying arms openly or concealed in a peaceable manner was
not, generally speaking, prohibited. The main exception was
that some colonies prohibited slaves from keeping or carrying
firearms.24
A New Jersey colonial law stands out as being one of a
kind that was not found anywhere else. In 1686, the colony
home deserves only minimalist protection or categorical exclusion.”
Charles, supra note 20, at 43.
23 1 HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN, ch. 28, § 9 (8th
ed. 1824).
24 See generally S. Halbrook, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS (1989).
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enacted a law providing that no person “shall presume
privately to wear any pocket pistol . . . or other unusual or
unlawful weapons”—which did not affect open carry—and
that “no planter shall ride or go armed with sword, pistol, or
dagger . . . excepting . . . all strangers, traveling upon their
lawful occasions thro’ this Province, behaving themselves
peaceably.”25 It is unclear why the latter provision was limited
to planters.
It was also unclear whether to ride or go armed
implied an element of doing so offensively,26 as was explicit in
the laws of other colonies. A 1694 Massachusetts law
punished “such as shall ride or go armed Offensively . . . in
Fear or Affray of Their Majesties Liege People,”27 and a 1699
New Hampshire law instructed justices of the peace to arrest
“affrayers, rioters, disturbers or breakers of the peace, or any
other who shall go armed offensively . . . .”28
The Glorious Revolution of 1689 overthrew James II,
who had disarmed the Protestants, and resulted in the
enactment of the Declaration of Rights, which provided: “That
the Subjects which are Protestants, may have Arms for their
Defence suitable to their Condition, and as are allowed by
Law.”29 That led to overthrow or reform of the royal
governments in some of the American colonies.30 It is unclear
how long New Jersey’s 1686 law remained on the books, but it
passed into oblivion.

N.J. LAWS 289, ch. 9 (1686). Patrick Charles calls this “the earliest
American statute prohibiting ‘going armed,’” but it was unlike any
other statute. Charles, supra note 20, at 32.
26 In a 1682 directive, New Jersey constables pledged “to arrest all
such persons, as in [their] presence, shall ride or go arm’d
offensively.” A BILL FOR THE OFFICE OF CORONER AND CONSTABLE, ch.
18 (Mar. 1, 1682), quoted in Ruben & Cornell, supra note 20, at 130
n.50.
27 MASS. ACTS 10, no. 6 (1694).
28 N.H. LAWS 1 (1699).
29 AN ACT DECLARING THE RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF THE SUBJECT, 1 W.
& M., Sess. 2, c.2, (1689).
30 “The rule of James II hung as heavy over colonists in America as it
did the people of England in 1688. . . . His arbitrary government, the
colonists believed, was reflected everywhere; in Andros’ regime over
all of New England, New York, and New Jersey . . . .” DAVID S.
LOVEJOY, THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 235 (1972).
25
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Whatever restrictive firearm law found its way into the
books hardly amounts to a long-standing regulation with
relevance to the Second Amendment. Another New Jersey
law, which passed in 1694, recited that “complaint is made by
the inhabitants of this Province, that they are greatly injured
by slaves having liberty to carry guns and dogs, into the
woods and plantations, under pretence of guning, to kill
swine.” It thus provided that “no slave or slaves . . . be
permitted to carry any gun or pistol, or take any dog with him
or them into the woods, or plantations, upon any pretence
whatsoever; unless his or their owner or owners, or a white
man, by the order of his or their owner or owners, be with the
said slave or slaves . . . .”31
Further, a 1722 New Jersey law provided that any
“Indian, Negro or Mullato Slave . . . carrying or Hunting with
any Gun, without License from his Master, shall, at the
Publick Whipping post, on the bare Back, be Whipt, not
exceeding twenty Lashes . . . .”32 That restriction may have
been loosened later, as a 1798 law mandated whipping only
for “any Negro [who] . . . shall be seen to hunt or carry a gun
on the first day of the week . . . .”33
New Jersey had no restrictions on the peaceable
carrying of arms by whites in the eighteenth century. New
Jersey’s code with statutes passed between 1702-1776 reflected
only a prohibition on shooting matches for gambling.34 A 1776
law defined the militia as “all effective Men between the Ages
of sixteen and fifty Years,” and required each member to
“constantly keep himself furnished with a good Musket . . .

An Act concerning Slaves, &c., § 1, East New Jersey Laws, October
1694, ch.II, L&S 340-342, available at
http://njlegallib.rutgers.edu/slavery/acts/A8.html.
32 An Act to prevent the Killing of Deer out of Season, and against
Carrying of Guns and Hunting by Persons not qualified, § 6, 2 Bush
293, 295 (May 5, 1722), available at
http://njlegallib.rutgers.edu/slavery/acts/A15.html.
33 An Act respecting Slaves. March 14, 1798, Acts 22nd G.A. 2nd
sitting, ch. DCCXXVII, p. 364-373, available at
http://njlegallib.rutgers.edu/slavery/acts/A75.html#s9.
34 Acts of the General Assembly of the Province of New Jersey 235
(Burlington 1776). The code published in 1800 contained certain
hunting regulations and a prohibition on setting a loaded gun. Laws
of the State of New Jersey 19-21 (1800).
31
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[or] a good Rifle-Gun,” or if a horseman, “a Pair of Pistols and
Holsters.”35
In fact, New Jersey did not require a permit to carry a
concealed firearm until 1905.36 Open carry was perfectly legal
until 1966, when a permit requirement was imposed.37 Thus,
in its entire history as a state until 1966, New Jersey allowed
law-abiding citizens to carry firearms in some manner without
being authorized to do so by the state.38 This exemplifies that,
in America’s history and tradition, the right to bear arms has
been the norm.

B. CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO
BEAR ARMS AND COMMENTARIES ON CARRYING ARMS
PEACEABLY
When the colonies declared themselves independent
states, they adopted their own constitutions, several of which
included declarations of rights. Of those, Pennsylvania and
Vermont declared: “That the people have a right to bear arms
for the defense of themselves, and the state . . . .”39 North
Carolina declared: “That the People have a right to bear Arms
for the Defense of the State . . . .”40 And Massachusetts
declared: “The people have a right to keep and bear arms for
the common defence.”41
When the federal Constitution was proposed in 1787
without a bill of rights, demands were made for a declaration.
In the Massachusetts ratification convention, Samuel Adams
proposed “that the said Constitution be never construed to
authorize Congress, . . . to prevent the people of the United
States, who are peaceable citizens, from keeping their own

Acts of the Council and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey 16869, 180 (Burlington 1776).
36 Compiled Statutes of New Jersey, Vol. II. 1759 (Soney & Sage
1911).
37 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:151–41 (1966).
38 See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 447-49 (3rd Cir. 2013) (Hardiman,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1100 (2014).
39 PA. DEC. OF RIGHTS, art. XIII (1776); VT. CONST., art. I, § 15 (1777).
40 N.C. DEC. OF RIGHTS, art. XVII (1776).
41 MASS. DEC. OF RIGHTS, art. XVII (1780).
35
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arms . . . .”42 In the Pennsylvania convention, the Dissent of
the Minority proposed a bill of rights, including: “That the
people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves
and their own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of
killing game; and no law shall be passed for disarming the
people or any of them, unless for crimes committed, or real
danger of public injury from individuals . . . .”43 The New
Hampshire convention resolved: “Congress shall never disarm
any citizen, unless such as are or have been in actual
rebellion.”44
In the Virginia convention, George Mason recalled that
“when the resolution of enslaving America was formed in
Great Britain, the British Parliament was advised . . . to disarm
the people; that it was the best and most effectual way to
enslave them.”45 And Patrick Henry implored: “The great
object is, that every man be armed.”46 The ensuing debate
concerned defense against tyranny and invasion.
The Virginia convention proposed a bill of rights
asserting “the essential and unalienable rights of the people,”
including: “That the people have a right to keep and bear arms
. . . .”47 In identical language, New York,48 North Carolina,49
and Rhode Island50 joined in the demand for what became the
Second Amendment. The right to bear arms had universal
support.

Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, John P.
Kaminski and Gaspare J. Saladino eds. (Madison: State Historical
Society of Wisconsin, 2000), vol. 6, at 1453.
43 Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, vol. 2 at
623-24 (Merrill Jensen ed.) (1976) (Madison: State Historical Society
of Wisconsin, 1976).
44 Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, vol. 18 at
188 (John P. Kaminski and Gaspare J. Saladino eds.)(1995) (Madison:
State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1995).
45 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution, vol. 3 at 380 (Jonathon Elliot ed.) (1836)
(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1836).
46 Id. at 386.
47 Id. at 658-59.
48 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, supra
note 44, at 298.
49 Id. at 316.
50 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution, supra note 45, at 335.
42
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An argument has been made that the Second
Amendment was adopted to protect slavery.51 Not only is
there no direct evidence of this, but as indicated above, the
Northern states led the effort to guarantee the right to bear
arms, and the recent attempt by the British to disarm the
Americans was the focus in the critical debates in the Virginia
convention. The defect in the early American polity was that,
because of slavery, the liberties in the Bill of Rights did not
extend to all Americans.
James Madison drafted what became the Bill of Rights.
In notes he prepared for introducing the amendments to the
House of Representatives in 1789, Madison averred that
“[t]hey relate 1st to private rights,” and observed a fallacy “as
to English Decl[aratio]n. of Rights – 1. mere act of
parl[iamen]t. 2. no freedom of press – . . . arms to
protest[an]ts.”52 By contrast, in America, rights would be
protected by the Constitution and not be subject to repeal by
the legislature, and these rights would be expanded to
recognize the press and not to limit the right to arms to
Protestants.
Madison introduced his draft to the House on June 8,
1789. It included the provision: “The right of the people to
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed . . . .”53 While
several states had proposed simply “that the people have a
right to keep and bear arms,” Madison inserted the stronger
guard that this right “shall not be infringed.”
Similarly, in 1790, the Pennsylvania Declaration of
Rights was revised to provide: “That the right of the citizens to
bear arms in defense of themselves and the state shall not be
questioned.”54 James Wilson, a Justice on the U.S. Supreme

Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 309 (1998).
52 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds.,
The Univ. Press of Virginia 1979).
53 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, at 10 (Charlene Bangs Bickford ed., John
Hopkins Univ. Press 1986).
54 Pa. Dec. of Rights, art. XXI (1790); THE PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO
CALLING THE CONVENTIONS OF 1776 AND 1790 305 (Harrisburg, Pa.,
John S. Wiestling, 1825).
51
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Court, presided over the convention and was a member of the
committee that drafted it.55
In his lectures on the law published in 1804, Wilson
stated that “the great natural law of self preservation . . .
cannot be repealed, or superseded, or suspended by any
human institution,” adding:
This law, however, is expressly recognised in
the constitution of Pennsylvania. “The right of
the citizens to bear arms in the defence of
themselves shall not be questioned.” This is
one of our many renewals of the Saxon
regulations. “They were bound,” says Mr.
Selden, “to keep arms for the preservation of
the kingdom, and of their own persons.”56
Just before the above passage, Wilson copied the
following from William Hawkins: “In some cases, there may
be affray, where there is no actual violence; as where a man
arms himself with dangerous and unusual weapons, in such a
manner, as will naturally diffuse a terrour among the
people.”57 Ignoring the phrase “in such manner,” Patrick
Charles asserts that passages like this show that “the carrying
of dangerous weapons in the public concourse – without the
license of government – is what placed the people in great fear
or terror . . . .”58 That further disregards the Pennsylvania’s
explicit declaration of “the right of the citizens to bear arms in
defense of themselves . . . .”
St. George Tucker’s 1801 edition of Blackstone’s
Commentaries contrasted the Second Amendment from the
English Declaration of Rights as follows: “The right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed . . . and
THE PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO CALLING THE CONVENTIONS OF 1776
153-54 (Harrisburg, Pa., John S. Wiestling, 1825).
56 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 657 (Harvard Univ. Press 1967)
(quoting Nathaniel Bacon, AN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE
OF THE LAWS AND GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND. 1 COLLECTED FROM
SOME MANUSCRIPT NOTES OF JOHN SELDEN, ESQ. 40 (London: D.
Browne & A. Millar) (1760)).
57 Id. at 654 (citing 1 Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, 135).
58 Patrick J. Charles, The Statute of Northampton by the Late Eighteenth
Century: Clarifying the Intellectual Legacy, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 10, 21
(2013).
55
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this without any qualification as to their condition or degree,
as is the case in the British government . . . .”59 Tucker called
this right “the true palladium of liberty,” adding that “[t]he
right of self defence is the first law of nature” and that
wherever the right to bear arms is prohibited, “liberty, if not
already annihilated, is on the brink of destruction.”60
Sir Matthew Hale, in Pleas of the Crown, noted a
presumption of warlike force in the use of weapons by an
assembly without the king’s licence, other than in a lawful
case. Tucker asked:
But ought that circumstance of itself, to create
any such presumption in America, where the
right to bear arms is recognized and secured in
the constitution itself? In many parts of the
United States, a man no more thinks, of going
out of his house on any occasion, without his
rifle or musket in his hand, than an European
fine gentleman without his sword by his side.61
In support of his argument that the Second
Amendment guarantees no right of a citizen to carry firearms
for self-defense, Saul Cornell argues that Tucker was referring
only to militiamen carrying military arms, excluding pistols,
and that the practice was limited to Virginia.62 But Tucker
referred simply to a man leaving his house “on any occasion”
with a firearm, contrasting him with a European gentleman
carrying a sword, neither without any military context. Nor
did Tucker’s statement conflict with the views of any other
American jurist.
Kentucky’s Constitution of 1792 declared “that the
right of the citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and
the state shall not be questioned.”63 A treatise by Charles
Humphreys entitled Compendium of the Common Law in Force in
Kentucky analyzed Blackstone and sought to determine what
1 St. George Tucker, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, at *143 n.40
(Philadelphia: William Young Birch & Abraham Small) (1803).
60 Id., app., at 300.
61 Id., vol. 5, at 19.
62 Saul Cornell, The Right to Carry Firearms Outside of the Home:
Separating Historical Myths from Historical Realities, 39 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1695, 1710-11 (2012).
63 Ky. Const., art. XII, § 22 (1792).
59
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in English law was still valid and what had become obsolete in
America. On the subject at hand he wrote:
Riding or going armed with dangerous or
unusual weapons, is a crime against the public
peace, by terrifying the people of the land,
which is punishable by forfeiture of the arms,
and fine and imprisonment. But here it should
be remembered, that in this country the
constitution guaranties to all persons the right
to bear arms; then it can only be a crime to
exercise this right in such a manner, as to terrify
the people unnecessarily.
We have a statute on the subject, related
to concealed weapons.64
Again denying a Second Amendment right of
individuals to bear arms, Saul Cornell asserts that the above
deviates from the common law and was unique to the South.65
To the contrary, Humphreys stated the traditional rule that
going armed was a crime only when done in a manner to
terrify the people, and the Second Amendment’s confirmation
of that rule would discourage deviation therefrom.
Kentucky’s 1813 prohibition on wearing a pocket pistol
and certain edged weapons concealed was declared
unconstitutional in Bliss v. Commonwealth, which held:
“Whatever restrains the full and complete exercise of that
right, though not an entire destruction of it, is forbidden by
the explicit language of the constitution.”66 In 1849, the
guarantee was revised to authorize the legislature to “pass
laws to prevent persons from carrying concealed arms.”67
The federal and state constitutional declarations of the
right to “bear arms” preclude any argument that somehow the
common law in America prohibited peaceably going armed.
Further, the passage of restrictions on concealed weapons
indicate that going armed, without more, was not already
Charles Humphreys, COMPENDIUM OF THE COMMON LAW IN FORCE
(Lexington, Ky.: William Gibbes Hunt) (1822).
65 Saul Cornell, The Right to Keep and Carry Arms in Anglo-American
Law: Preserving Liberty and Keeping the Peace, 80 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 11, 35 (2017).
66 Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90, 91-92 (1822).
67 Ky. Const., art. XIII, § 25 (1849).
64
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unlawful under the common law. Meanwhile the courts
would uphold such laws as long as open carry was allowed.

C. GOING ARMED IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: STATUTORY
MODELS
1. VIRGINIA’S ACT ON AFFRAYS, 1786
In Virginia, a Committee of Revisors—of which
Thomas Jefferson played the leading role—drafted a
restatement of the statutory law which included the common
law and elements of such English statutes as were deemed
applicable.68
One of the provisions reported by the
Committee, presented to the General Assembly by James
Madison, would be passed as an Act Forbidding and
Punishing Affrays (1786).69
It reformulated the Statute of
Northampton to provide that no man shall “come before the
Justices of any court, or other of their ministers of justice doing
their office, with force and arms, . . . nor go nor ride armed by
night nor by day, in fairs or markets, or in other places, in
terror of the country . . . .”70 This offense had three pertinent
elements: (1) going or riding armed; (2) in fairs, markets or
“other places,” which according to the canon of noscitur a sociis
(associated words) meant other places like fairs and markets;
and (3) in terror of the country.
A sufficient indictment of the above could not simply
allege the first element but would have been required to allege
all three. As Virginia courts held, it was “an established rule,
that in general, if an Indictment pursues the words of a Statute
in describing an offence, . . . it is sufficient . . . .”71 A demurrer
Edward Dumbauld, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE LAW 134-36
(1978).
69 2 Jefferson, PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 519-20 (Julian P. Boyd
ed., 1951). “This Bill is a good example of TJ’s retention of the
language of early English statutes, with its archaic provision for the
forfeiture of ‘armour,’ &c. It is also a good example of TJ’s ability to
condense the involved language of the earlier English statutes that
he thought worthy of retaining in the revision . . . .” Id. at 520 (note
by editor).
70 A COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
VIRGINIA, OF A PUBLIC AND PERMANENT NATURE, AS ARE NOW IN
FORCE, ch. 21, at 30 (1803).
71 Rasnick v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 356, 357 (1823).
68
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(motion to dismiss) would be sustained for an insufficient
indictment.72
It is unclear how long the Virginia law remained on the
books, and no judicial decision exists reciting its language.
Had it been read to ban the mere carrying of firearms, its
draftsman Thomas Jefferson would have been one of its
biggest violators, as he regularly went armed and defended
the right to do so.73 As he advised his 15-year old nephew:
“Let your gun therefore be the constant companion of your
walks.”74
If it was still law in 1838, the enactment was not
interpreted to prohibit the habitual carrying of concealed
weapons, as in that year the legislature for the first time
provided: “If a free person, habitually, carry about his person
hid from common observation, any pistol, dirk, bowie knife,
or weapon of the like kind, he shall be fined fifty dollars.”75
This provision would have been unnecessary if going armed
was already an offense, not to mention that this provision only
restricted going armed habitually and hiding the arms. Law
enforcement officers were not exempt—the Virginia high court
affirmed the conviction of a constable who “drew out a pistol
and dirk” against a person to levy an execution.76
In 1847, Virginia enacted the following: “If any person
shall go armed with any offensive or dangerous weapon,
without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury, or
violence to his person, or to his family or property, he may be
required to find sureties for keeping the peace.”77 Any person
engaging in the subject conduct, if anyone complained, could
continue doing if the court did not find that keeping the peace
required sureties. If sureties were required, he could simply
obtain them. There are no published judicial decisions on the
provision.

Commonwealth v. Lodge, 43 Va. (2 Gratt.) 579, 580-81 (1845).
See S. Halbrook, THE FOUNDERS’ SECOND AMENDMENT 131, 260,
316-18 (2008). In 1803, Jefferson wrote an innkeeper that “I left at
your house . . . a pistol in a locked case,” and asked that a friend pick
it up. See original letter at http://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/ampage?collId=mtj1&fileName=mtj1page029.db&recNum=210.
74 Jefferson, WRITINGS 816-17 (Merril D. Peterson ed., 1984).
75 VA CODE tit. 54, ch. 196, § 7 (1849).
76 Hicks v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. (7 Gratt.) 597, 598 (1850).
77 1847 Va. Laws 127, 129, § 16.
72
73
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At a more general level, courts could require a person
to enter into a recognizance with sureties to keep the peace,
particularly in regard to a specified person who was
threatened, for a given period.78 If a person violated the
recognizance, a writ of scire facias could be issued alleging the
violation with specificity and requiring the person to answer
in court.79 Specific threats or harm were required for a finding
that sureties were needed to ensure that the person kept the
peace.
Virginia’s only prohibition on carrying a firearm per se
applied to African Americans. As discussed below, slaves
could not keep or carry a gun, and free persons of color were
required to obtain a license to do so, which the court had
discretion to issue or not issue.

2. THE MASSACHUSETTS MODEL, 1795
The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights of 1780
provided: “The people have a right to keep and bear arms for
the common defence.”80
A Massachusetts Act of 1795
incorporated a version of the Statute of Northampton in the
following words:
That every Justice of the Peace, within
the county for which he may be commissioned,
may cause to be staid and arrested, all affrayers,
rioters, disturbers, or breakers of the peace, and
such as shall ride or go armed offensively, to the fear
or terror of the good citizens of this Commonwealth,
or such others as may utter any menaces or
threatening speeches, and upon view of such
Justice, confession of the delinquent, or other
legal conviction of any such offence, shall
require of the offender to find sureties for his
keeping the Peace, and being of the good
behaviour; and in want thereof, to commit him

Welling's Case, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 670 (1849).
Randolph v. Brown, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 351 (1823).
80 Mass. Dec. of Rights, art. XVII (1780).
78
79
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to prison until he shall comply with such
requisition . . . .81
Elements of the offense included (1) riding or going
armed, (2) offensively, i.e., not peaceably, and (3) to the fear or
terror of the good citizens. Just peaceably riding or going
armed alone was not an offense. As the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court stated the rule, every word defining a
crime must be given meaning and charged in an indictment:
The general principle applicable to criminal
pleading requires that an indictment shall set
forth, with technical particularity, every
allegation necessary to constitute the offence
charged; and the constitution, adopting and
sanctioning this principle, provides, “that no
subject shall be held to answer for any crime or
offence, until the same is fully, substantially
and formally described to him.”82
The explicit definition of the crime as riding or going armed
“offensively, to the fear or terror of the good citizens” is given
further meaning and context by the above associated crimes
referring to “affrayers, rioters, disturbers, or breakers of the
peace,” and those who “utter any menaces or threatening
speeches.”
There are no judicial opinions on the 1795 enactment.
However, an 1825 decision did differentiate being armed from
misuse of arms: “The liberty of the press was to be
unrestrained, but he who used it was to be responsible in case
of its abuse; like the right to keep fire arms, which does not
protect him who uses them for annoyance or destruction.”83

1795 Mass. Acts 436, ch. 2; 2 PERPETUAL LAWS OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 259 (1801) (emphasis added).
82 Commonwealth v. Eastman, 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 189, 223 (1848).
The court added: “If an indictment for murder, should allege merely
that the accused had committed the crime of murder upon the
person of one A. B., or, if an indictment for larceny should simply set
forth, that the defendant had stolen from C. D., in neither case would
the offence be set forth with the particularity and precision required
by law.”
83 Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 314 (1825).
81
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3. THE REFINED MASSACHUSETTS MODEL, 1836
The 1795 Act was superseded by the Act of 1836,
entitled “Of Proceedings to Prevent the Commission of
Crimes,” which provided:
If any person shall go armed with a
dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive
and dangerous weapon, without reasonable
cause to fear an assault or other injury, or
violence to his person, or to his family or
property, he may, on complaint of any person
having reasonable cause to fear an injury, or
breach of the peace, be required to find sureties
for keeping the peace, for a term not exceeding
six months, with the right of appealing as
before provided.84
The above did not prohibit a person from going armed
with the specified weapons. It required an aggrieved person
to file a complaint and to show reasonable cause to fear injury
or breach of the peace, and such a finding by the court would
have to entail threats or other bad behavior. Even then, the
subject person could show reasonable cause to fear injury. If
the court found otherwise and determined that his keeping the
peace required sureties, the person could simply find sureties
and continue going armed. The following explains the
procedures required by the Act.
Reasonable cause to fear an injury. What would be
required of a complainant to show “reasonable cause to fear
an injury”? By analogy, a magistrate had to have “reasonable
cause” to believe certain things to get a search warrant. “The
oath to the complainant’s belief, and not to his suspicion, is
one of ‘the formalities prescribed by the laws,’ without which
‘no warrant ought to be issued.’”85 Here, reasonable cause to
fear an injury, not speculation or suspicion, was required.
Similar language was used in a decision regarding an
indictment for a forcible entry, which “must be accompanied
with circumstances tending to excite terror”: “There must at
1836 Mass. Laws 748, 750, ch.134, § 16.
Commonwealth v. Lottery Tickets, 59 Mass. 369, 372 (1850)
(citation omitted).
84
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least be some apparent violence; or some unusual weapons; or
the parties attended with an unusual number of people; some
menaces, or other acts giving reasonable cause to fear, that the
party making the forcible entry will do some bodily hurt to
those in possession, if they do not give up the same.”86 The
mere presence of ordinary weapons, without more, would not
suffice.
Reasonable cause to fear a breach of the peace. A breach of
the peace was not considered a minor manner—one case
referred to “breaches of the peace or other great disorder and
violence, being what are usually considered mala in se or
criminal in themselves . . . .”87 Reasonable cause to fear such
would entail anticipated violence or related unlawful conduct:
“Breaches of the peace comprise not only cases of actual
violence to the person of another, but any unlawful acts,
tending to produce an actual breach of the peace . . . .”88
Under a 1783 enactment, “justices of the peace had power to
bind over to keep the peace those who are complained of as
having a present intent to commit a breach of the peace, as
well as those who are charged with having committed such an
offence . . . .”89
On complaint of any person. When a complaint was
made that “any person has threatened to commit an offence
against the person or property of another,” the magistrate was
required to examine the complainant and any witnesses under
oath and to prepare a written complaint.90 If the magistrate
Commonwealth v. Shattuck, 58 Mass. 141, 145 (1849) (emphasis
added); see also Commonwealth v. Dudley, 10 Mass. 403, 409 (1813)
(“There must be some apparent violence offered, in deed or in word,
to the person of another; or the party must be furnished with
unusual offensive weapons, or attended by an unusual multitude of
people; all which circumstances would tend to excite terror in the
owner”).
87 Commonwealth v. Willard, 39 Mass. 476, 478 (1839); see Fifty
Associates v. Howland, 59 Mass. 214, 218 (1849) (reference to “such a
degree of force, as would tend to a breach of the peace”).
88 Pearce v. Atwood, 13 Mass. 324, 332 (1816) (citing 4 Bl. Com. 255).
89 Commonwealth v. M’Neill, 36 Mass. 127, 141 (1837).
90 Act of Feb. 1836, ch. 134 § 2, 1836 Mass. Laws 748; see
Commonwealth v. Wallace, 80 Mass. 382 (1860) (a complaint would
have one’s full name, a sworn statement of the complaint, and a
signature. It would be certified by the appropriate authority, which
was “an averment by him that the signature and oath were those of
the complainant . . . .”).
86
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determined that “there is just cause to fear that any such
offence may be committed,” he issued a warrant reciting the
substance of the complaint and directed an officer to
apprehend the person.91
Finding sureties. The Act reflected general remedies
available to a person who was injured or feared injury or
breach of the peace by another. “When the person complained
of is brought before the magistrate, he shall be heard in his
defense, and he may be required to enter into a recognizance,
with sufficient sureties, in such sum as the magistrate shall
direct, to keep the peace” towards all persons but “especially
towards the person requiring such security,” for no more than
six months.92 As applied in a similar scenario, a threatened
person “may apply to a magistrate, and ask that sureties to
keep the peace may be required of one from whom he may
apprehend any serious personal injury.”93
Appeal. The defendant could appeal to the court of
common pleas, which would hear the witnesses and could
either discharge him or require him to enter into a new
recognizance in a sum determined to be proper.94
Insufficient cause. Alternatively, if on examination the
magistrate determined that it did “not appear that there is just
cause to fear that any such offence will be committed,” the
person was to be discharged. If the magistrate deemed the
complaint “unfounded, frivolous or malicious,” he could
order the complainant to pay the costs of the prosecution.95 As
held in a prior decision, a groundless complaint could have
further consequences: “A false complaint, made with express
malice, or without probable cause, to a body having
competent authority to redress the grievance complained of,
may be the subject of an action for a libel; and the question of
malice is to be determined by the jury.”96
The above procedures were not required for certain
offenses committed in the presence of a magistrate. Any
person who would “make an affray, or threaten to kill or beat
another, or to commit any violence or outrage against his
Id. § 3.
Id. § 4.
93 Mason v. Mason, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 506, 508 (1837).
94 Act of Feb. 1836, ch. 134 §§ 9-11, 1836 Mass. Laws 748.
95 Id. § 7.
96 Bodwell v. Osgood, 20 Mass. 379 (1825).
91
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person or property,” or would “contend with hot and angry
words, to the disturbance of the peace,” could be ordered to
keep the peace or be of good behavior.97 No further process or
other proof was required.98 This provision identifies the types
of analogous behavior included in the next section about going
armed in a manner causing a person to have “reasonable cause
to fear an injury, or breach of the peace.”99
Failing to keep the peace. Generally, if a person who
violated his recognizance to keep the peace such as by
assaulting the complainant, the Commonwealth could
prosecute an action of debt upon this forfeited recognizance,
or bring a writ of scire facias.100 It was decided in one case:
“Where one, being under a recognizance to keep the peace,
committed a breach of the peace, for which he was indicted
and fined, it was held that he was nevertheless liable to an
action for the penalty of the recognizance.”101
In sum, as exemplified by Virginia and Massachusetts,
the statutory offense of going armed to the terror of the people
required proof that the defendant did so in an offensive
manner that terrified actual persons. Further, provisions
requiring persons who went armed to find sureties to keep the
peace required findings of offensive behavior that threatened
the peace. Peaceably carrying arms was not subject to any
sanction.

D. GOING ARMED IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: JUDICIAL
PRECEDENTS
To what extent was the prohibition of the Statute of
Northampton recognized as a common law offense in
America? The courts of Tennessee and North Carolina
grappled with the issue, with the former questioning its
applicability and the latter holding that it was. The latter also
provided significant detail regarding how both going armed
and doing so to the terror of the people were separate
elements of the offense, both of which must be alleged in the
indictment and proven to the jury.
Allen v. State, 183 Wis. 323, 331 (1924).
Act of Feb 1836, ch. 134 § 15, 1836 Mass. Laws 748.
99 Id. § 16.
100 Commonwealth v. Green, 12 Mass. 1 (1815).
101 Commonwealth v. Braynard, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 113 (1828).
97
98
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1. TENNESSEE: SIMPSON V. STATE
In Simpson v. State, the Supreme Court of Errors and
Appeals of Tennessee dismissed an indictment alleging that
“William Simpson, laborer, with force and arms being arrayed
in a warlike manner, in a certain public street or highway
situate, unlawfully, and to the great terror and disturbance of
divers good citizens, did make an affray . . . .”102 The court
held that the indictment was insufficient as it failed to allege
the elements of an affray of fighting between two or more
persons.
The Attorney General sought to rely on Hawkins’
claim that “there may be an affray . . . where a man arms
himself with dangerous and unusual weapons, in such a
manner as will naturally cause terror to the people, which is
said always to have been an offence at common law, and is
strictly prohibited by many statutes.”103
That doctrine,
averred the court, relied “upon ancient English statutes,
enacted in favor of the king, his ministers and other servants,
especially upon the statute of the 2d Edward III,” which
provided that no man “shall go or ride armed by night or by
day, etc.”104
The Simpson court repeated Hawkins’ comment about
the Statute of Northampton “that persons of quality are in no
danger of offending against this statute by wearing their
common weapons” in places and on occasions where
common.105 The court held the English statute, at least as
construed by the Attorney General, not to be incorporated into
American common law:
It may be remarked here, that ancient English
statutes, from their antiquity and from long
usage, were cited as common law; and though
our ancestors, upon their emigration, brought
with them such parts of the common law of
England, and the English statutes, as were
Simpson v. State, 13 Tenn. Reports (5 Yerg.) 356, 361 (1833).
Id. at 357-58 (citing WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS
OF THE CROWN OR A SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS RELATING TO
THAT SUBJECT: DIGEFTED UNDER THEIR PROPER HEADS 70 (1716)).
104 Id. at 358.
105 Id. at 358-59.
102
103
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applicable and suitable to their exchanged and
new situation and circumstances, yet most
assuredly the common law and statutes, the
subject-matter of this fourth section,106 formed
no part of their selection.107
The Simpson court held in the alternative that if the
Statute of Northampton had been brought to America, it was
abrogated by Tennessee’s constitutional guarantee “that the
freemen of this state have a right to keep and to bear arms for
their common defence.”108
That guarantee precluded
recognition of “a man’s arming himself with dangerous and
unusual weapons” as part of the crime of an affray. “By this
clause of the constitution, an express power is given and
secured to all the free citizens of the state to keep and bear
arms for their defence, without any qualification whatever as
to their kind or nature . . . .” The constitution having thus said
that “the people may carry arms,” doing so in itself could not
be the basis of the element of “terror to the people” necessary
for an affray.109
Recall the flimsy allegations of the bare-bones
indictment that the laborer Simpson with no detail other than
that “with force and arms being arrayed in a warlike
manner”—who knows what specific act that legalese applied
to—“to the great terror” of unidentified citizens, he made an
“affray” with no one.110

2. NORTH CAROLINA: STATE V. HUNTLEY
By contrast to the above case, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina upheld indictments with language and under
reasoning reflecting the legacy of the Statute of Northampton
as including both going armed and doing so in a concrete
manner to terrorize specific people. In State v. Langford, the
indictment alleged that the defendants “with force and arms,
at the house of one Sarah Roffle, an aged widow woman, . . .
did then and there wickedly, mischievously and maliciously,
i.e., Hawkins, supra note, at 103.
Id. at 359.
108 Id. at 360 (quoting TENN. CONST., art. 11, § 26).
109 Id.
110 Id. at 361.
106
107
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and to the terror and dismay of the said Sarah Roffle, fire
several guns . . . .”111 As the court stated, “men were armed
with guns, which they fired at the house of an unprotected
female, thus exciting her alarm for the safety of her person and
her property. This is the corpus delicti . . . .”112 The court
recalled the words of Hawkins that “there may be an affray
when there is no actual violence: as when a man arms himself
with dangerous and unusual weapons, in such a manner as
will naturally cause a terror to the people . . . .”113
Similarly, in State v. Huntley, the North Carolina
Supreme Court upheld an indictment alleging that the
defendant, “with force and arms, . . . did arm himself with
pistols, guns, knives and other dangerous and unusual
weapons, and, being so armed,” publicly threatened before
various citizens “to beat, wound, kill and murder” another
person and others, causing citizens to be “terrified,” all “to the
terror of the people . . . .”114 The court quoted Blackstone’s
references to “the offence of riding or going armed with
dangerous or unusual weapons, . . . by terrifying the good
people of the land,” and to the Statute of Northampton.115 It
further quoted Hawkins’ reference to an affray as including
“where a man arms himself with dangerous and unusual
weapons in such a manner, as will naturally cause a terror to
the people . . . .”116
The Huntley court next turned to the guarantee of the
North Carolina bill of rights securing to every man the right to
“bear arms for the defence of the State.” While this “secures to
him a right of which he cannot be deprived,” he has no right
to “employ those arms . . . to the annoyance and terror and
danger of its citizens . . . .”117 That said, “the carrying of a gun
per se constitutes no offence. For any lawful purpose—either
of business or amusement—the citizen is at perfect liberty to
carry his gun.”118 However, he may not carry a weapon “to

State v. Langford, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 381 (1824).
Id. at 383.
113 Id.
114 State v. Huntley, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 418, 419 (1843).
115 Id. at 420-21 (quoting 4 Bl. Com. 149).
116 Id. at 421 (quoting Haw. P. C. B. 1, ch. 28, sect. 1).
117 Id. at 422.
118 Id. at 422-23.
111
112
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terrify and alarm, and in such manner as naturally will terrify
and alarm, a peaceful people.”119

E. PROHIBITIONS ON CARRYING CONCEALED WEAPONS
It was not an offense at common law or in the statutes
of any state at the Founding peaceably to carry a concealed
weapon. Going armed without the arm being seen inherently
could not cause terror to anyone. In the early Republic, some
states enacted laws prohibiting the carrying of arms in a
concealed manner. Finding it necessary to do so further
demonstrates that there was no preexisting common law
offense of going armed per se.
Given that a ban on concealed carry was
unprecedented, it was no small wonder that the first judicial
decision thereon by a state court declared it unconstitutional.
In Bliss v. Commonwealth, the Kentucky Supreme Court
reasoned that “in principle, there is no difference between a
law prohibiting the wearing concealed arms, and a law
forbidding the wearing such as are exposed; and if the former
be unconstitutional, the latter must be so likewise.”120 What if
the legislature banned open carry, the court asked? It
reasoned that the rule could not be that whichever mode of
carry was banned first was thereby constitutional.121
The sister courts of other states rejected that view and
upheld the bans on concealed carry because open carry was
allowed. The Alabama Supreme Court said it this way in
upholding the conviction of a sheriff for carrying a concealed
pistol: “A statute which, under the pretence of regulating,
amounts to a destruction of the right, or which requires arms
to be so borne as to render them wholly useless for the
purpose of defence, would be clearly unconstitutional.”122
The Georgia Supreme Court overturned the conviction
of a defendant “for having and keeping about his person, and
elsewhere, a pistol, the same not being such a pistol as is
known and used as a horseman’s pistol,” but where it was not
alleged that he carried it concealed.123 While Georgia had no
Id. at 423.
Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2 Litt. 90, 92 (Ky. 1822).
121 Id. at 93.
122 State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616-17 (1840).
123 Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 247 (1846).
119
120
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state constitutional guarantee to bear arms, the court reasoned:
“The language of the second amendment is broad enough to
embrace both Federal and state governments . . . . Is it not an
unalienable right, which lies at the bottom of every free
government?”124
By contrast, the Supreme Court of Indiana, in a onesentence opinion, stated: “It was held in this case, that the
statute of 1831, prohibiting all persons, except travelers, from
wearing or carrying concealed weapons, is not
unconstitutional.”125
While holding that a statute prohibiting the carrying of
concealed weapons was not in violation of the Second
Amendment, the Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned that the
right to carry arms openly “placed men upon an equality. This
is the right guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States, and which is calculated to incite men to a manly and
noble defense of themselves, if necessary, and of their country
. . . .”126 As this suggests, the open carry rule was tied into the
social norms of the day.
Eric Ruben and Saul Cornell argue that the Nunn and
the other above decisions, except for the Indiana case, are
tainted because they were from “the slaveholding South” and
that no right peaceably to carry firearms was recognized in the
North.127 But there were no decisions on the right to bear arms
from courts in the North because the Northern states did not
restrict the peaceable carrying of arms, concealed or openly.
Ruben and Cornell point to such laws as the 1836
Massachusetts enactment analyzed extensively above, seeing
no significance in the provision requiring a person to file a
complaint that he or she had “reasonable cause to fear an
injury, or breach of the peace” by the person going armed.128
In sum, the passage of prohibitions in some states on
carrying concealed weapons and the decisions thereon
upholding open carry again illustrate that there was no
recognized common law offense simply of going armed
Id. at 250.
State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229 (Ind. 1833) (emphasis in original).
126 State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann 489, 490 (1850); see also State v. Jumel,
13 La Ann. 399 (1858).
127 Eric M. Ruben and Saul Cornell, Firearm Regionalism and Public
Carry: Placing Southern Antebellum Case Law in Context, 125 YALE L.J.
FORUM 121, 123 (2015).
128 Id. at 130.
124
125
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without more. It would have been unnecessary to restrict
concealed carry if both concealed and open carry were already
crimes under the common law. Moreover, more Southern
judicial decisions rendered carry bans unconstitutional only
because the Northern states had no prohibitions on peaceably
carrying arms.

F. PROHIBITIONS AND LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR
AFRICAN AMERICANS
1. THE SLAVE CODES
From colonial times until adoption of the Thirteenth
Amendment, slaves were prohibited from keeping and
bearing arms in most circumstances or altogether.
Additionally, free blacks were prohibited from possessing
arms unless they obtained a license, which was subject to an
official’s discretion.
Such laws reflected that African
Americans were not trusted or recognized to be among “the
people” with the rights of citizens.
Virginia law provided that “[n]o negro or mulatto
slave whatsoever shall keep or carry any gun, powder, shot,
club or other weapon whatsoever, offensive or defensive,”
punishable by no more than thirty-nine lashes, except those
living at a frontier plantation could be licensed to “keep and
use” such weapons by a justice of the peace.129 Further, “[n]o
free negro or mulatto, shall be suffered to keep or carry any
fire-lock of any kind, any military weapon, or any powder or
lead, without first obtaining a license from the court” where he
resided, “which license may, at any time, be withdrawn by an
order of such court.”130
As a Virginia court held, among the “numerous
restrictions imposed on this class of people [free blacks] in our
Statute Book, many of which are inconsistent with the letter
and spirit of the Constitution, both of this State and of the
United States,” were “the restriction upon the migration of

VIRGINIA, REVISED CODE OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA: BEING A
COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, OF A
PUBLIC AND PERMANENT NATURE, AS ARE NOW IN FORCE; WITH A
GENERAL INDEX 111 § 7 (1819).
130 Id. § 8.
129
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free blacks into this State, and upon their right to bear
arms.”131
In Georgia, it was unlawful “for any slave, unless in
the presence of some white person, to carry and make use of
fire arms,” unless the slave had a license from his master to
hunt.132 It was also unlawful “for any free person of colour in
this state, to own, use, or carry fire arms of any description
whatever . . . .”133 Georgia’s high court held: “Free persons of
color have never been recognized here as citizens; they are not
entitled to bear arms, vote for members of the legislature, or to
hold any civil office.”134
Maryland made it unlawful “for any negro or mulatto .
. . to keep any . . . gun, except he be a free negro or mulatto . . .
.”135 It was unlawful “for any free negro or mulatto to go at
large with any gun . . . .”136 However, this did not “prevent
any free negro or mulatto from carrying a gun . . . who shall . .
. have a certificate from a justice of the peace, that he is an
orderly and peaceable person . . . .”137 This requirement was
based on such person’s status as less than a citizen. As one
court stated: “Free negroes were and are now ‘those who were
emancipated from slavery, or born free, but subjected to
various disabilities and penal enactments.’”138
Later, the above was made stricter to require a license
not just to bear, but merely to keep a firearm: “No free negro
shall be suffered to keep or carry a firelock of any kind, any
military weapon, or any powder or lead, without first
obtaining a license from the court of the county or corporation
in which he resides . . . .”139
Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. 447, 449 (Gen. Ct. 1824).
HORATIO; CRAWFORD MARBURY, WILLIAM H. DIGEST OF THE LAWS
OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, FROM ITS SETTLEMENT AT BRITISH PROVINCE,
IN 1755, TO THE SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN 1800, INCLUSIVE
424 (1802).
1333 Ga. Laws § 7 226, 228 (1833).
134 Cooper v. Savannah, 4 Ga. 72 (1848).
135 VIRGIL MAXCY, LAWS OF MARYLAND. WITH THE CENTER, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE, AND ITS ALTERATIONS,
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES, AND ITS AMENDMENTS 297 (1811).
136 Id. at 298.
137 Id.
138 Brown v. State, 23 Md. 503, 508 (1865).
139 Otho, et al. Scott. Maryland Code, 464 (1860).
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Delaware forbade “free negroes and free mulattoes to
have, own, keep, or possess any gun [or] pistol,” except that
such persons could apply to a justice of the peace for a permit
to possess a gun or fowling piece, which could be granted
with a finding “that the circumstances of his case justify his
keeping and using a gun . . . .”140 The police power was said to
justify restrictions such as “the prohibition of free negroes to
own or have in possession fire arms or warlike
instruments.”141
Alabama provided that “no slave shall keep or carry
any gun,” but added that “any justice of the peace may grant .
. . permission in writing to any slave, on application of his
master or overseer, to carry or use a gun and ammunition
within the limits of said master’s or owner’s plantation . . . .”142
In short, a slave had to have a license to possess a gun, but it
could not be removed from the plantation.
The above is just a sampling of some of the slave code
provisions and how they applied to free blacks. Licensing was
purely discretionary based on the issuing authority’s
determination of the applicant’s circumstances or need to keep
or carry a firearm.

2. NORTH CAROLINA’S DISCRETIONARY LICENSING FOR
FREE PERSONS OF COLOR
North Carolina typically provided that “no slave shall
go armed with Gun,” unless he had a certificate to carry a gun
to hunt, issued with the owner’s permission.143
Its
discretionary license-issuance system applicable to free
persons of color was explained in more detail by judicial
decisions in that state than in others, and merits further
analysis.
North Carolina made it unlawful “if any free negro,
mulatto, or free person of color, shall wear or carry about his
or her person, or keep in his or her house, any shot gun,
musket, rifle, pistol, sword, dagger or bowie-knife, unless he
Laws of the State of Delaware ch. 176 § 1, 8, at 208 (1841).
State v. Allmond, 7 Del. 612, 641 (Gen. Sess. 1856).
142 JOHN G. AIKIN. DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA:
CONTAINING ALL THE STATUTES OF A PUBLIC AND GENERAL NATURE,
IN FORCE AT THE CLOSE OF THE SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
391-92 (1833).
143 Statutes of the State of North Carolina 93 (1791).
140
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or she shall have obtained a licence therefor from the Court of
Pleas and Quarter Sessions of his or her county . . . .”144 The
provision was upheld in State v. Newsom as constitutional
partly on the ground that “the free people of color cannot be
considered as citizens . . . .”145 The court also opined that the
Second Amendment only applied to the federal government,
not to the states.146
Somewhat bizarrely, the court further stated: “It does
not deprive the free man of color of the right to carry arms
about his person, but subjects it to the control of the County
Court, giving them the power to say, in the exercise of a sound
discretion, who, of this class of persons, shall have a right to
the licence, or whether any shall.”147 This is reminiscent of
today’s judicial jargon that the right of the people to bear arms
is not infringed by laws granting officials discretion to deny
them that right.
Adding that having weapons by “this class of persons”
was “dangerous to the peace of the community,” a later
decision further explained the basis of the discretionaryissuance policy:
Degraded as are these individuals, as a class, by
their social position, it is certain, that among
them are many, worthy of all confidence, and
into whose hands these weapons can be safely
trusted, either for their own protection, or for
the protection of the property of others
confided to them. The County Court is,
therefore, authorised to grant a licence to any
individual they think proper, to possess and
use these weapons.148

State v. Newsom, 27 N.C. 250, 250 (1844) (quoting Act of 1840, ch.
30).
145 Id. at 254. Despite that, a defendant being tried “as a free negro,
for carrying arms,” had a right not to exhibit himself to the jury to
determine his status as a free negro, as that would violate his
privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Jacobs, 50 N.C. 259
(1858).
146 Id. at 251.
147 Id. at 253.
148 State v. Lane, 30 N.C. 256, 257 (1848).
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The court could not only deny a license outright, but
also to limit a license to carry only in certain places. In State v.
Harris, a free person of color had a license to carry a gun on his
own land, but he was hunting with a shotgun elsewhere with
white companions.149 The court held that “the county court
might think it a very prudent precaution to limit the carrying
of arms to the lands of the free negro” and that the act did not
“prevent the restriction from being imposed.”150
In short, free persons of color were not entitled to the
right to keep and bear arms because they were not considered
to be citizens with all the rights of citizens. That status was
reflected in the requirement that they obtain a license, subject
to the issuing authority’s subjective decision of whether the
applicant was a proper person with a proper reason.

3. CITIZENSHIP: “TO KEEP AND CARRY ARMS WHEREVER
THEY WENT”
As analyzed above, slaves and persons of color were
not considered citizens, and thus having arms, if allowed at
all, was subject to discretionary licensing by state authorities.
Of course, the deprivation of arms was one of a bundle of
disabilities bolstering the peculiar institution of slavery. As St.
George Tucker wrote: “To go abroad without a written
permission; to keep or carry a gun, or other weapon; to utter
any seditious speech; to be present at any unlawful assembly
of slaves; to lift the hand in opposition to a white person,
unless wantonly assaulted, are all offences punishable by
whipping.”151
The Supreme Court, in Dred Scott v. Sanford,
notoriously held that African Americans were not citizens and
had no rights that must be respected.152 Chief Justice Taney
noted that “the laws of the present slaveholding States . . . are
full of provisions in relation to this class,” and such laws
“have continued to treat them as an inferior class, and to
subject them to strict police regulations . . . .”153 But if blacks
State v. Harris, 51 N.C. 448 (1859)
Id. at 449.
151 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, A DISSERTATION ON SLAVERY: WITH A
PROPOSAL FOR THE GRADUAL ABOLITION OF IT, IN THE STATE OF
VIRGINIA 65 (1796).
152 Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
153 Id. at 412.
149
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were “entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens, it
would exempt them from the operation of the special laws and
from the police regulations which they [whites] considered to
be necessary for their own safety.”154
To avoid that result, Taney listed some of the
prominent rights that African Americans would have, but of
which they were currently deprived in numerous states,
should their citizenship be recognized:
It would give to persons of the negro race, who
were recognized as citizens in any one State of
the Union, the right to enter every other State
whenever they pleased, singly or in companies,
without pass or passport, and without
obstruction, to sojourn there as long as they
pleased, to go where they pleased at every hour
of the day or night without molestation, unless
they committed some violation of law for which
a white man would be punished; and it would
give them the full liberty of speech in public
and in private upon all subjects upon which its
own citizens might speak; to hold public
meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and
carry arms wherever they went.155
Overturning Dred Scott would be a primary objective of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which overruled that decision.156
Senator George F. Edmunds explained shortly after the
Amendment was ratified: “What was the fourteenth article
designed to secure? . . .[T]hat the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States shall not be abridged or denied by
the United States or by any State; defining also, what it was
possible was open to some question after the Dred Scott
decision, who were citizens of the United States.”157
In sum, having no arms right was an incident of
slavery. Even free blacks were required to obtain a license to
possess or carry a firearm, which license could be denied or
limited subject to the discretion of the issuing authority. Such
Id. at 416-17.
Id. at 417 (emphasis added).
156 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 307-08 (Scalia, J., concurring).
157 Congressional Globe, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1000 (1869).
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laws were based on the denial of the rights of citizenship to
African Americans.

II. CONCLUSION
The story does not end with the end of the early
Republic. Following the War of 1861-65, a new chapter in the
history of the Second Amendment began. While it is beyond
the scope of this study, this new chapter involved the
reenactment of the Slave Codes as the Black Codes that sought
to keep African Americans unarmed, the enactment of the
Civil Rights Act and Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1866 that
sought to protect the Second Amendment rights and other
rights of the freed slaves, and the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment that sought in part to constitutionalize that
protection.158
The Freedmen’s Bureau Act symbolized this era with
its declaration that “the right . . . to have full and equal benefit
of all laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty,
personal security, and the acquisition, enjoyment, and
disposition of estate, real and personal, including the
constitutional right to bear arms, shall be secured to and
enjoyed by all the citizens . . . without respect to race or color,
or previous condition of slavery.”159
Without delving further into that history here, it would
be appropriate to mention in this law review that the
Freedmen’s Bureau, which was charged with implementing
the above mandate, was headed by General Oliver O.
Howard. In his autobiography, Howard chronicles the
daunting task of assisting African Americans in their
transition from slaves to freedmen in all spheres, from civil
rights and work conditions to education and voting. He was
instrumental in the founding of Howard University,160 which
was established as a college for freedmen and is today the
largest historically-black university nationwide, as well as
Lincoln Memorial University, which was founded as a college
See generally STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, SECURING CIVIL RIGHTS:
FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, & THE RIGHT TO BEAR
ARMS (2010).
159 Freedmen’s Bureau, 14 Stat. 176-177 (1866) (quoted in McDonald,
561 U.S. at 773).
160 See 2 O. O. HOWARD, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF OLIVER OTIS HOWARD
340-401, 452-55 (1908).
158
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for the Cumberland Gap region and whose law school
provides attorneys for the often under-served region of
Appalachia and beyond.161 Having taught in the philosophy
department at Howard University decades ago, this author
was pleasantly surprised to learn of this connection when
invited to present at the Second Amendment Symposium
sponsored by the Lincoln Memorial University Law Review.
***
While it would be a delusional reach to claim that the
Second Amendment implicitly incorporated the Statute of
Northampton of 1328, no question exists that the right to bear
arms does not include the carrying of dangerous and unusual
weapons to the terror of one’s fellow citizens. Peaceably
carrying arms was not an offense at the Founding or in the
early Republic, and instead was enshrined as a constitutional
right at both state and federal levels. Some states restricted
carrying arms concealed, but allowed open carry. Prohibitions
on the keeping and bearing of arms by African Americans, or
the requirement that they obtain licenses to do so subject to
the discretion of the authorities, were based on their condition
as slaves or non-citizens.
To what extent may a State prohibit the peaceable
bearing of arms, or limit the right to select persons determined
by law enforcement officials to have a “need” to do so? To
date, the Supreme Court has not decided the validity of such a
prohibition under the Second Amendment, but should do so.

See id. at 568-69, 586-87; Lincoln Memorial University, Heritage
and Mission, https://www.lmunet.edu/about-lmu/heritagemission.php (lasted visited Sept. 18, 2019).
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